We study community structure in time-dependent legislation cosponsorship networks in the Peruvian Congress, and we compare them briefly to legislation cosponsorship networks in the United States Senate. To study these legislatures, we employ a multilayer representation of temporal networks in which legislators in each layer are connected to each other with a weight that is based on how many bills they cosponsor. We then use multilayer modularity maximization to detect communities in these networks. From our computations, we are able to capture power shifts in the Peruvian Congress during 2006-2011. For example, we observe the emergence of "opportunists", who switch from one community to another, as well as cohesive legislative communities whose initial component legislators never change communities. Interestingly, many of the opportunists belong to the group that won the majority in Congress.
Introduction
Political networks encompass several types of connectivity -based on social ties, voting similarities, and other features -and it is important to analyze them to understand political systems [1] [2] [3] [4] . In MAP:questions and comments on the figure: (1) "congressperson" ! "legislator" (applies to many other figs as well); (2) are the edges between legislators and bills undirected? I guess so, since we're using bipartite networks, but in the US one has both sponsors and cosponsors, so there is a directed relationship; does that happen in Peru or not? and if it does happen, we have to say that we ignore it; (3) it should be "-" and not "-" before the word 'mode' in the labels bill b1
bill b2 bill b3 was representing the "opposition" to the government 1 , and the reorganization of legislators from the minority parties into different legislative groups 2 . There were 7 parties/groups at the beginning of the 2006-2011 Congress, 14 groups were formed during that period (though not all were present at one time), and there were 9 political groups and 3 legislators without a group affiliation at the end of the Congress in 2011 [48] . A legislative year starts on 27 July every year, so we use "I" to the denote bills between that date and the last day of December and "II" to denote bills between January and before the beginning of the next legislative year 3 . Therefore, 0607 I occurs in the second half of the year 2006, 0607 II occurs during the first half of the year 2007, and so on. A cosponsorship relation occurs between a legislator and a bill, so each half-year constitutes a bipartite (i.e., two-mode) network. As we illustrate in Fig. 1(a) , if bill b 1 is cosponsored by legislators l 1 , l 2 , and l 3 , then bill b 1 is adjacent to l 1 , l 2 , and l 3 via an undirected edge. For simplicity, we do not distinguish between the main sponsor of a bill and his/her cosponsors, so everyone who participates in sponsoring a bill is adjacent to the bill (i.e., we ignore the directed nature of these edges, as in Ref. [20] ). Of course, two bills can share legislators [such as legislator l 3 for bills b 1 and b 2 in Fig. 1(a) ], and two legislators can cosponsor multiple bills (such as legislators l 4 and l 5 , who cosponsor bills b 2 and b 3 ). Such overlapping relationships are important for "projections" of a bipartite cosponsorship network (BCN) [see Figs. 1(b) and 1(c)]. Because we are interested in the relationships among the politicians, we use these networks to construct unipartite (i.e., one-mode) networks among legislators [see Fig. 1(b) ]. The projection throws away some information [14, 15, 49, 50 ], but we nevertheless consider such legislator-mode projections as our primary type of network 5 of 19 among legislators.
In Fig. 1 , we illustrate our procedure to "project" from a BCN to weighted, unipartite bill and legislator networks. In the former, a weighted edge indicates the number of cosponsoring legislators that two bills have in common; in the latter, a weighted edge indicates the number of bills that a pair of legislators both cosponsored. We also remove self-edges from the unipartite networks. In Table 1 , we show some summary statistics for each of the ten periods (0607 I, 0607 II, 0708 I, 0708 II, 0809 I, 0809 II, 0910 I, 0910 II, 1011 I, and 1011 II). As a basic network statistic, for each bipartite network, we show the degree distributions of bills and legislators in Fig. 2 . Observe that the number of legislators who cosponsor bills is distributed much more heterogeneously compared to the number of bills that individual legislators cosponsor. A similar result was reported for legislation cosponsorship networks in the U.S. [19] . From now on, we examine the weighted unipartite networks between legislators [see Fig. 1(b) ]. To obtain deeper insights than what we can see from the basic calculations in Fig. 1 (and to illustrate a fascinating difference between the Peruvian and U.S. legislatures), we will examine multilayer community structure across the ten legislative sessions. In particular, this will allow us to explore how coherent, densely-connected sets of legislators change from 2006 to 2011.
By partitioning the bills into ten consecutive periods, we obtain a temporal network of cosponsorship relations. The weighted legislator-mode projection networks for different periods all include most legislators (though some legislators are "invisible" during a specific period due to their absence in cosponsoring activities). There are 130 legislators 4 in total, and we examine the temporally changing relations in legislation cosponsorship over the ten periods. We construct a multilayer representation [36, 38] of the temporal network from the ten consecutive periods. A legislator in a given period is a single node-layer, so each legislator has ten corresponding node-layers. To study community structure, we will partition the multilayer network, which is composed of the node-layers and the edges between them, into disjoint communities.
Multilayer community detection
Reference [38] introduced a method for time-dependent community detection by deriving and maximizing a multilayer generalization of the modularity objective function:
where i and j are legislators, s and r (where s, r ∈ {1, . . . , T }, and we divide time into T nonoverlapping windows) are layers (i.e., periods, which consist of half-years), δ is the Kronecker delta, and g i,s is the community to which legislator i is assigned in layer s (so δ(g i,s , g j,r ) = 1 if node i in layer s and node j in layer r belong the same community). The adjacency-tensor element A i js gives the number of bills that legislators i and j cosponsor in period s. Thus, A i js = 0 if i and j do not cosponsor a single bill, and we take A iis = 0 for every i to remove self-edges. Additionally, k i,s is the strength of node i (i.e., the sum of the weights of the intralayer edges attached to node i) in layer s, the quantity m s = i j A i js /2 is the sum of the weights in layer s, and γ s is the resolution parameter in layer s. The quantity C jsr 0 if nodelayer ( j, s) is adjacent to node-layer ( j, r) (i.e., legislator j is connected to him/herself across different periods), and C jsr = 0 otherwise. We assume so-called "diagonal" coupling [36] , so nonzero interlayer coupling cannot occur between different legislators. We use the factor 2µ = i js A i js + jsr C jsr to normalize Q ∈ [−1, 1]. See [51] for recent theoretical work on multilayer modularity maximization. When a legislator does not appear in some period, all intralayer and interlayer edges attached to his/her associated node-layer have a value of 0. We simplify the interlayer connections further by taking C jsr = ω if two consecutive layers s and r share legislator j and C jrs = 0 otherwise. Hence, interlayer edges occur only between consecutive layers, the interlayer coupling is "ordinal" [36] , and it is uniform across legislators. By also taking γ s = γ for all layers, we are left with an "intralayer resolution parameter" γ to go along with the 'interlayer resolution parameter' ω [52] . As in one of the approaches in Ref. [38] , we use a variant [53] of the Louvain method [54] to maximize Q.
Results

Measuring switches in political allegiances
Motivated by the work in [55] , we define the "flexibility" f i of legislator i to be the number of times that he/she changes community membership during the observation time in the multilayer network. That is,
where we recall that g i,r indicates the community assignment of legislator i in layer r ∈ {1, . . . , T }. The term "flexibility" was used in [55] in a study of functional brain networks, and we adopt it for the present . We show different communities using different colors and symbols, and we sort the legislators by political party (i.e., the parties for which they were candidates), which we sort alphabetically from left to right and separate with vertical lines. The political parties are Alianza por el Futuro, Frente del Centro, Partido Asprista Peruano, Perú Posible, Restauración Nacional, Unidad Nacional, and Unión por el Perú. paper. A complementary concept is network "persistence," which was defined in Ref. [51] as 2) where N is the number of entities (e.g., legislators) in a multilayer network. In Fig. 3 , we show the maximum modularity and mean flexibility f i for the temporal multilayer legislator-projected network from multilayer modularity maximization [38] using a variant [53] of the Louvain method [54] . The flexibility results in Fig. 3(b) suggest that there is a nontrivial relationship between flexibility values and the parameters γ and ω, so it is helpful to explore these results further for several values of (γ, ω). In this paper, we present results for four parameter combinations: (γ, ω) = (1.0, 20.0), (1.0, 60.0), (1.5, 20.0), and (1.5, 60.0). Although the two values of the interlayer coupling strength ω seem large in comparison to those in previous works [38, 52] , we wish to use values that are comparable to intralayer coupling strengths (i.e., the intralayer edge weights), which we take to be the numbers of cosponsored bills. With these computations, we are able to illuminate interesting political structures in the Peruvian Congress and to subsequently contrast them with community structure in the U.S. Senate. In Figs. 4 and 5, we illustrate time-dependent community structure for several values of (γ, ω). Larger values of γ capture smaller communities (and a larger number of communities), and larger values of ω capture more temporally coherent communities (as expected) [38] . We then perform similar computations for U.S. Senate cosponsorship networks. We downloaded the U.S. Senate data from [56] . These data start from the 93rd Congress (which covers the dates 3 January 1973-3 January 1975) and go through the 110th Congress (which covers the dates 3 January 2007-3 January 2009). We construct a multilayer U.S. Senate cosponsorship network using the same procedure (see Fig. 1 ) as for the Peruvian Congress, except that each time window in the former covers an entire 2-year Congress (in contrast to a half-year for Peru). We also use the same values of the resolution parameters γ and ω.
With our calculations, we demonstrate that multilayer modularity maximization can yield insight about time-dependent community structure in real political cosponsorship data, and the adjustable intralayer resolution parameter and interlayer coupling allow one to explore structure at multiple scales. We now compare results from our two data sets, and we interpret our results on the Peruvian Congress in more detail in Section 3.2.
We illustrate time-dependent community structure for the U.S. Senate in Fig. 6 ). Unsurprisingly, we observe a relatively stable bipolar structure (Democrats versus Republicans) in the U.S. Senate, which contrasts sharply with the more intricate temporal community structure in the Peruvian Congress. Although the observation periods -5 years versus 36 years for the whole duration, and one half-year versus two years for each layer -for the two legislatures are different (which is a very important issue to consider in our comparison of the two legislatures), we stress that it is the shorter of the two that experiences much more dramatic changes in community structure, further emphasizing the sharp contract in community-structure dynamics in these two countries. Figure 4 illustrate the switching of the UPP legislators to other parties. We discuss such political reorganizations further in Section 3.2.
Dynamical reorganization of the Peruvian Congress
To discuss time-dependent community structure in the Peruvian Congress in more detail, we need to give some context about the legislators and the Peruvian political system.
• A legislator must obtain support from at least five other legislators to present a bill proposal. Each legislator represents one Region (similar to a U.S. State) in Peru, and each Region can have one or more legislators from one or more parties. Lima, the capital of Peru, has 30% of all seats [59] . A legislator needs to be part of a political group that includes at least six legislators to be represented on the Congress Board 5 .
• The Peruvian Congress has only one chamber. In 2006, 25 parties competed for 120 seats, and 7 parties won at least one seat [61] . The party (PAP) of the President of the executive branch did not obtain a majority (it won 36 seats) in Congress, and the party (UPP) of the runner-up for President won the largest number of seats (45 seats). PAP is a traditional and longstanding party (almost 90 years old) and UPP was composed primarily of new regional leaders and popular figures (from outside the political arena) 6 . At the beginning of the 2006-2011 Congress, it was not clear whether UPP would be able to remain cohesive and gain more support from the minority groups to control the Congress or if the traditional cohesiveness of PAP's legislators would play in PAP's favor and allow them to keep control of Congress.
The winning party (PAP) in the executive branch garnered the second-largest number of seats (with 9 fewer than the majority) and kept control of the Congress. They presided over every Congress Board, and they never lost their internal cohesion, as none of their members abandoned the party to join another group. By contrast, UPP and other parties lost legislators to other political groups or founded new groups. Among the 45 legislators that UPP had in 2006, only 7 remained in 2011 [48] . Figures 5 captures reorganizations in the political parties. For instance, we observe opportunistic behavior of legislators who tend to strengthen ties outside their original community. This seems to have occurred not only among legislators whose original party had a small share in Congress but also to members of the majority party (UPP), which included many of the most flexible legislators. Eight legislators were members of at least three different groups; seven of these legislators were from UPP 7 , and one legislator (Wilson Michael Urtecho Medina) was from the UN. By examining time-dependent community structure, one can also see the emergence of new groups (e.g., Partido Demócrata Peruano, which included Carlos Torres Caro, Gustavo Espinoza, and Rocío González from the UPP). One can also observe the cohesiveness in PAP and the Fujimori group (i.e., Alianza por el Futuro).
Legislators from UPP were not the only ones who were switching to other groups. Moreover, the switching behavior of legislators may have been reinforced when UN, which originally had 17 seats, ceased to be an alliance in 2008. The legislators from Solidaridad Nacional (SN), one of the parties in the UN alliance, formed a new group during the second half of the 2006-2011 Congress (when the 2011 presidential elections were in sight) 8 . Officially, however, UPP supported SN in the 2011 election [63] .
We check for geographical correlations with our observations by comparing individual legislators' district location to their flexibility [see Eq. (3.1)], which indicates how often they change community assignment. In Fig. 7 , we plot individual legislators' flexibility values on top of their district locations on a map of Peru, and we observe that the central part of the country (including the capital city Lima) tends to have more flexible legislators. We list some notably flexible legislators in Table 2 .
Our discussions above suggest that Peruvian legislators need to be strategic to maximize his/her political opportunities. For example, they can either take a "loyalist" or an "opportunist" strategy. In the latter strategy, a politician moves to what appears to be a more promising group or party for their political future. Moreover, one can examine the loyalty level of parties based on how many legislators remain with them over time. For example, during the 2006-2011 Congress, PAP and the Fujimori group kept all of their members. Additionally, as we have seen above, having a significant presence in the Peruvian Congress is not sufficient to ensure loyalty: UPP had the majority but lost several legislators to other groups. Such strategic behavior can result from several possible causes:
• The number of legislators that are needed to found a group is six, which can encourage members of parties with fewer than six seats to switch to other groups (even to ones with a rather different political 'ideology' or 'identity').
• There is a current trend of low reelection rates in the Peruvian Congress, so as an election draws near, legislators may need to develop a strategy to distance themselves from parties that become unpopular and associate more closely with groups that become popular.
• Another current trend is for party leaders to invite popular figures to their Congressional roster. This may affect the cohesiveness of a party.
By 2011, twelve legislators were in a different party than the one to which they were associated during the 2006 elections. Only one of them was reelected in the 2011 election. Nine of the twelve were not from Lima, and none of those nine were reelected. Although party switching is considered to be an effective strategy for short-term gain, the very low reelection rate in the last three Congressional elections (2001, 2006, 2011) may also suggest that it is not an effective long-term strategy. To investigate such a hypothesis, it will be important to compare the Peruvian Congress to Congresses in other nations.
In contrast to party switching in the Peruvian legislature, U.S. Senators have much firmer community memberships, and their flexibility does not seem to include as many geographic characteristics. We show their flexibilities on a map of the U.S. in Fig. 8 , and we again observe a bipolar structure among the U.S. Senators. We list some notably flexible Senators in Table 3 . The list depends sensitively on the value of the intralayer resolution parameter γ (e.g., it consists mostly of Republicans for some parameter values but not for Democrats for others), in contrast to our observations for the Peruvian Congress. We also recall that using different values of resolution parameters can be helpful for investigating different structural features (e.g., ones with different sizes) in networks [47, 52] .
Conclusions and discussion
We examined time-dependent community structure to explore dynamical restructuring in the Peruvian Congress in the 2006-2011 session by studying networks constructed from (publicly available) legislation cosponsorship data. Our computations give a lens with which to view the frequent switches in the political group affiliations of legislators in Peru, and our investigation illustrates a dissolution of the majority party at the beginning of 2006 Peruvian Congress. We contrasted these Peruvian politics with the political climate in the U.S., in which there are two highly polarized political parties.
From a more general standpoint, our calculations indicate that even cosponsorship data alone is able to reveal political restructuring in legislative bodies. For countries, such as Peru, in which democratic institutions are still immature, 9 it should be very insightful to use quantitative methods such as network analysis to analyze political restructuring during the maturation process of governmental bodies.
As more data become available amidst the modern data deluge, it will be possible to conduct further investigations to elucidate both political and social network structures among legislators. Future research can include focusing on bills rather than politicians, studying change points in the temporal dynamics [68] , examining the role of overlapping communities, pursuing case studies in other countries, and more. It is interesting to examine the relationship between public labels such as party membership and quantities (such as flexibility) that one can measure from procedures like time-dependent community detection using (publicly available) legislation cosponsorship data. Ideally, one can use dynamic network analysis to reveal insights that complement those from more traditional techniques (e.g., statistical analyses) in quantitative and qualitative political science.
